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995 
FINDING A FAIR BALANCE FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
AND FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
Christine DiGregorio* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today’s society is consumed with the lives of celebrities and 
incorporates them as an important part of modern everyday life.  Many 
individuals today “keep up” with the Kardashians as much as they keep 
up with the lives of their personal friends.1  A contestant on “The 
Bachelor” or “The Voice” is now a household name with whom some 
fans feel a personal connection.2  As a result, a celebrity’s identity 
pervades and influences our culture. 
Celebrities have even become prominent in political and 
societal movements.  For example, the attendance of Beyoncé, Katy 
Perry and many others at the Second Inauguration of former President 
Barack Obama was highly publicized.3  More recently, the revelation 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2017, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; Bachelor of Science 
2014, State University of New York at Albany.  I would like to thank my Mom and Dad for 
their endless love, moral support, and encouragement throughout my entire law school career; 
and my brothers, Danny and Brian, who always lifted my spirits at times when I was too 
stressed to do so on my own.  Additionally, I would like to thank all my close family and 
friends who have extended words of encouragement and support throughout my time at law 
school.  You truly motivated and inspired me to get through some of the longest days and 
nights.  Finally, I would like to thank Professor Rena Seplowitz for her guidance and 
invaluable insight throughout the writing process of this comment. 
1  Keeping up with the Kardashians June 4, 2013 premiere averaged three million viewers. 
The Kardashians Still Going Strong in Season 8, LIVE JOURNAL (June 4, 2013), 
http://ohnotheydidnt.livejournal.com/78395171.html.  
2 Millions of viewers express their opinions on social media each time the show is aired 
about the contestants on reality TV shows such as “Keeping up with the Kardashians,” 
“American Idol,” and “The Voice.” See, e.g., Weekly Top Ten, NIELSEN SOCIAL, 
http://www.nielsensocial.com/nielsentwittertvratings/weekly (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
3 Kelly Clarkson, Jamie Fox and John Legend all performed at the inauguration.  
Additionally, rapper Jay-Z, singer John Mayer, actress Eva Longoria, and actor Mario Lopez 
were in attendance.  Celebrities of President Barack Obama’s Second Inauguration, SF GATE 
(Jan. 21, 2013), http://blog.sfgate.com/politics/2013/01/21/celebrities-of-president-barack-
obama’s-second-inauguration-with-photo-gallery/. 
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by Caitlyn Jenner4 has paved the way for the acceptance of transgender 
individuals in both society and professional sports.5  Kanye West’s 
whirlwind announcement of his run for presidency in 2020 at the MTV 
Video Music Awards6 threw society into a frenzy.7  The cultural and 
political influences of these household names demonstrate how 
celebrities have developed into more than figures of entertainment.   
These famous individuals are just a few of the celebrities who 
have extended their influence in areas far beyond the entertainment 
field.8  Many people duplicate diets of celebrities,9 and even follow 
celebrities’ suggestions on Instagram10 posts, dining at places that they 
believe the celebrity had visited.11  It is no wonder that so many 
commercial retailers, business owners, and restaurant owners desire a 
celebrity’s endorsement for their products.  
However, it is precisely the celebrities’ influence that 
reinforces the importance of their right of publicity in their own 
 
4 Caitlyn, formerly Bruce Jenner, revealed in an exclusive interview with Diane Sawyer that 
she was a transgendered woman, and after years of hiding her real identity, would be making 
the change to a woman. Transcript of Bruce Jenner Coming Out as Transgender Will Only 
Make You Respect Jenner More, BUSTLE (Apr. 24, 2014). 
  http://www.bustle.com/articles/78832-transcript-of-bruce-jenner-coming-out-as-
transgender-will-only-make-you-respect-jenner-more.  See also Bruce Jenner - The Interview, 
ABC (July 15, 2015) http://abc.go.com/shows/2020/listing/2015-04/24-bruce-jenner-the-
interview. 
5 Caitlyn Jenner was awarded the Arthur Ashe Courage Award at the 2015 ESPYS. Caitlyn 
Jenner Accepts Arthur Ashe Courage Award, ESPN (July 16, 2015), 
http://espn.go.com/espys/2015/story/_/id/13264599/caitlyn-jenner-accepts-arthur-ashe-
courage-award-espys-ashe2015. 
6 Kanye West Declares 2020 Presidency vid at VMAs, CNN (Sept. 5, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/31/politics/kanye-west-2020-running-for-president-vma/. 
7 See, e.g., This is How Twitter Wants Kayne West’s Presidential Dream to Unfold!, DNA 
INDIA (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.dnaindia.com/entertainment/report-this-is-how-twitter-
wants-kanye-west-s-presidential-dream-to-unfold-2120971. 
8 See supra notes 1-7. 
9 5 Healthy Celebs – And How to Eat Like Them, PEOPLE (Dec. 12, 2013), 
http://greatideas.people.com/2013/12/30/5-healthy-celebs-and-how-to-eat-like-them/. 
10 Instagram is a social media site where members of society post pictures of their everyday 
lives.  An individual can “like” a picture that someone else posts, to represent his approval or 
support of the photo.  A Quick Overview of Instagram, BUSINESS PRODUCTIVITY (Sept. 10, 
2012), https://www.instagram.com.  
11 See, e.g., jonathancheban, INSTAGRAM, https://instagram.com/p/BB5JBC3j6tx/ (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2017). Celebrity Jonathan Cheban – known for being best friends with the 
Kardashian sisters – posted a picture of a milkshake from Black Tap Craft Burgers and Beer 
in New York City.  The picture has over 16,000 likes, meaning that over 16,000 people saw 
the picture and now know where to find a milkshake exactly like the one that Jonathan posted. 
Id. 
2
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identity.  The right of publicity is an intellectual property right that 
enables celebrities to control the use of their identities and prohibit 
their unauthorized use.12  The difference between a celebrity 
endorsement of a commercial product13 and the exploitation of a 
celebrity’s identity for commercial benefit14 is crucial.  The celebrity 
must be protected from pirates of his identity; however, this protection 
must also be limited because he is not entitled to a monopoly in his 
identity.  Many intellectual property rights have been established as a 
way of promoting science and fostering creation of ideas.15  
Accordingly, the right of publicity protection must stay true to this 
intellectual property law foundation, and not hinder creativity.  
Problems arise when the right of publicity is invoked in forms of 
expression that can also fall under the First Amendment free speech 
protection, and thus a proper balance between the two important 
protections must be determined.   
This comment argues that the best way to resolve the ongoing 
conflict of balancing the First Amendment and right of publicity 
protections is with a modified fair use defense, that utilizes both the 
copyright fair use doctrine and the Federal Lanham Act fair use 
defense in its analysis.  Section II provides a background of the right 
of publicity and its increasing expansion.  Section III reviews the 
balancing tests that are currently applied in the Circuit Courts and 
points out the problems with the tests.  Section IV compares copyright 
 
12 The right of publicity prohibits the appropriation of “the commercial value of a person’s 
identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indica of identity for 
the purposes of trade.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995); see also 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West) (prohibiting “using another’s name, voice, or likeness, in any 
manner or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or 
soliciting purchases of products, merchandise, goods, or services.”).  Generally, the right of 
publicity protects the “commercial use” of the name, image or likeness.  See J. Thomas 
McCarthy, 1 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 3.2 (West) (describing that “what is 
required is proof that the defendant intended to obtain a commercial advantage.”). 
13 Celebrity Endorsements, ADWEEK, http://www.adweek.com/topic/celebrity-
endorsements (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
14 Michael Jordan was successful in his claim against the Chicago-based super market chain 
Dominick’s for using his name and promoting a product without his permission. Supermarket 
Chain Pay Michael Jordan, ESPN (Aug. 22, 2015), 
http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/13486052/supermarket-chain-pay-michael-jordan-89-
million-use-name 
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 8 (stating that the purpose of Congress is “to promote the progress 
of science and useful arts”). See also White v. Samsung Elec. Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513-16 
(9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasizing that 
“intellectual property rights aren’t free: they’re imposed at the expense of future creators and 
of the public at large;” and that “creativity is impossible without a rich public domain.”). 
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law with the right of publicity, and examines the Fair Use Doctrine as 
used in copyright law.  Section V delineates the proposed new Right 
of Publicity Defense to be used in right of publicity cases.  Finally, 
Section VI analyzes two cases under the new proposed balancing test 
exemplifying the compelling justification for the new defense.  
II.  THE BIRTH OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AS                          
RIGHT OF PRIVACY  
The right of publicity originated in the right of privacy, which 
stems from “the right to be left alone.”16  In 1890, Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis published The Right to Privacy, which has since been 
deemed one of the most influential law review articles in history, and 
planted the seed for the right of publicity.17  Warren and Brandeis 
argued that the law already established a need for a right of privacy, 
and that this privacy included the right to life and the right to enjoy 
life.18  Thus, in their influential article, they expanded these rights, and 
interpreted the right to life and the right to enjoy life as a right to be 
left alone,19 better known as a right to privacy.  At the time of the 
seminal article, changes in society had created a need for a privacy 
right.20  Unauthorized intrusion into one’s private life offered no 
recourse, and although not every state was quick to adopt the common 
law right of privacy,21 this need for protection and a right to recover 
from this nonconsensual intrusive disclosure of personal information 
 
16 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
17 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203 
(1954). 
18 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 193-96. 
19 Michael Schoenberger, Unnecessary Roughness: Reconciling Hart and Keller with a 
Fair Use Standard Benefitting the Right of Publicity, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1875, 1879-80 (2013) 
(quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
193 (1890)); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“[The Founders] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their 
emotions, and their sensations.  They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let 
alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”). 
20 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 195-96 (emphasizing that the invention of new 
mechanisms like the instantaneous photo and the methods of the news media created a need 
for a protection of private lives). 
21 The New York Court of Appeals originally rejected the adoption of a common law right 
of privacy. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902), 
superseded by statute, N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50, § 51 (Consol. 2001 & Supp. 2005). 
4
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and pictures led to many states recognizing a common law right of 
privacy.22  
This right of privacy still made it difficult for celebrities to 
recover for damage as a result of infringement of their image, since 
many courts were unsympathetic to their claim, holding that a 
celebrity’s lifestyle diminished her rights to privacy.23  Consequently, 
celebrities sought a way to protect themselves against the unauthorized 
commercial use of their images and likeness.24  The Second Circuit 
first addressed this concern in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, Inc.25  In that case, the court held that a professional 
baseball player not only had a right of privacy, but also had a right of 
publicity for the value of his photographs used by a gum 
manufacturer.26  Judge Jerome Frank, writing for the court, recognized 
that “[i]n addition to and independent of the right of privacy, a man has 
a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant 
the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture.”27   
Following this case, two influential law review articles 
expanded and solidified the justification for the right of publicity.  
First, Melville Nimmer expanded on the Warren-Brandeis privacy 
essay, and reiterated the inadequacy of available legal protections for 
celebrities to avoid the unauthorized commercial exploitation of their 
identities.28  Additionally, Nimmer noted that an individual invests a 
great deal of time, effort, and skill in order to obtain a publicly desired 
 
22 As a result of the article written by Warren & Brandeis, fifteen states adopted a common 
law right of privacy: Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. 
Nimmer, supra note 17, at 203 nn.3-4. 
23 O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (holding that a professional football player 
could not claim damages under privacy law for the unauthorized use of his picture in a beer 
advertisement since he is not a private person); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 
24 F. Supp. 1004, 1007-09 (W.D. Okla. 1938) (finding that Paramount celebrities waived their 
right to privacy and the defendant could sell posters with their names and photographs without 
their permission), rev’d on other grounds, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939); Pallas v. Crowley 
Milner & Co., 54 N.W.2d at 596-97 (holding that plaintiff model waived her rights of privacy 
and could not recover because she was a public figure).   
24 See generally Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 202 F.2d 866 (2d 
Cir. 1953). 
25 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
26 Id. at 869. 
27 Id. at 868. 
28 Nimmer, supra note 17, at 216. 
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status,29 and that accordingly, “every person is entitled to the fruits of 
their labors.”30 
Moreover, in 1960 William Prosser expanded on the right of 
privacy and categorized it into four distinct torts: intrusion to solitude, 
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, false light in the public 
eye, and appropriation of one’s name and likeness for the defendant’s 
advantage.31  Prosser defined his fourth category as a “defendant 
making use of the name to pirate the plaintiff’s identity for some 
advantage of his own;”32 this later became known as the right of 
publicity.33   
Further, in 1977, the Supreme Court, in its only decision 
addressing the right of publicity, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co.,34 acknowledged the right of publicity as a state law 
cause of action,35 but did not define its scope.  As a result, while most 
states recognize the right of publicity either via case law, statute, or 
both,36 the scope varies from state to state.37   
A. Expanding the Scope of the Right of Publicity and 
the First Amendment Implications 
1. The Scope of the Right of Publicity 
The scope of the right of publicity extends far beyond the 




31 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
32 Id. at 403. 
33 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983).  See 
also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977). 
34 433 U.S. 562, 567 (1977). 
35 Id. at 566. 
36 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 10:7 (stating that “courts have uniformly held that the 
right of publicity is a property right.”). 
37 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc. 717 F.3d 141, 152 (3d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that Zacchini “is 
the only supreme court case addressing the First Amendment in a right of publicity context.”).  
Some states recognize the right of publicity as a property right, acknowledging that an 
individual’s identity is her own property, which she is free to control as she wants.  Moreover, 
other states recognize the right of publicity more narrowly as a privacy right. MCCARTHY, 
supra note 12, at § 6:3; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West) (expressly prohibiting “using 
another’s name, voice, or likeness,” and protecting it as a publicity right; but see NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 20-202 (West) (protecting an unwanted use of a name or likeness as a “privacy” right). 
6
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right to objects such as racecars,38 slogans such as “The Greatest,”39 
and even catch phrases such as “Here’s Johnny.”40  One significant 
demonstration of a broad interpretation of right of publicity protection 
was White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc..41  In that case, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the use of a robot in a Samsung commercial dressed similarly 
to the celebrity television personality, Vanna White, was a violation of 
White’s right of publicity.42  The advertisement contained an image of 
a robot wearing a wig, gown, and jewelry, which were all used to 
resemble Vanna White’s attire on the television show.43  In addition to 
the similarities in physical appearance, the robot was also posed next 
to a game board which was undeniably recognizable as the Wheel of 
Fortune game show set, in a way that White was infamously known to 
do.44  The court emphasized that the more popular a celebrity becomes, 
the easier it is to evoke her identity without resorting to the obvious 
means such as name, likeness, or voice;45 and therefore, the identities 
of the most popular celebrities are the most attractive for advertisers 
and should be afforded ample protection.46   
The need to balance the right of publicity with the First 
Amendment was evident to Judge Alcaron, who emphasized the need 
to ensure that protection of the creators of intellectual property should 
not hinder the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.47  Additionally, he acknowledged the important role the 
courts play balancing these competing interests when necessary.48  
 
38 Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that 
the use of a white pinstripe on a red race car in a commercial, without an actual picture of the 
plaintiff, violated the plaintiff’s right of publicity because these objects were identifying 
characteristics that implied the plaintiff’s likeness and therefore constituted an unauthorized 
commercial use of his identity). 
39 Ali v. Playgirl Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that captioning a 
drawing of a nude boxer in the magazine as “the Greatest” sufficiently identified Ali as the 
implied character in the picture and therefore invaded his right of publicity). 
40 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding 
that the use of the phrase “Here’s Johnny” for the portable toilet company was an infringement 
of Carson’s right of publicity because the phrase was broadly associated with Carson and was 
part of his identity). 
41 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1396. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1408 (Alcaron, J., dissenting). 
46 White, 971 F.2d at 1408 (Alcaron, J., dissenting). 
47 Id. (Alcaron, J., dissenting). 
48 Id. (Alcaron, J., dissenting). 
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Moreover, Judge Kozinski in his dissent to the denial of rehearing 
White warned of the risks of overprotecting the right of publicity.49  He 
emphasized that a rich public domain was essential for creativity, and 
cautioned “overprotection stifles the very creative forces it’s supposed 
to nurture.”50 
With such a broad interpretation of the publicity right, it was 
inevitable that conflicts with other rights would emerge.   
2.  First Amendment Protections of Free Speech 
and Expression  
The First Amendment is the safeguard of freedom of speech 
and expression in our society.51  It provides that “Congress shall make 
no law … abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.”52  Two 
widely accepted justifications for the First Amendment are: (1) The 
fostering of a “free marketplace of ideas” essential to a democratic 
society; and (2) “fulfilling the human need for self-expression.”53  
While many celebrities claim exclusive ownership under the right of 
publicity for the use of their identities,54 the defendants in these cases 
argue that this power to exclude others from appropriating their 
identities violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment 
because it limits their means of expression.55  To resolve this conflict, 
courts have invoked a commercial speech doctrine.56  Under this 
doctrine, the First Amendment affords greater protection to 
noncommercial speech because it serves as an essential service to the 
 
49 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993). 
50 Id. (emphasizing that “creativity is impossible without a rich public domain” because 
each creator builds on the works of those before him). 
51 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
52 Id. 
53 Roberta Rosenthall Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: A Property 
and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 66 (1994). 
54 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 564 (1977) (arguing 
that defendant appropriated his property right in his performance); White v. Samsung Elecs. 
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1992) (alleging that Samsung used plaintiff’s 
image in violation of plaintiff’s property right to her image). 
55 See id. at 1397 (arguing that Samsung’s use of the robot was protected by the freedom of 
expression); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 396 (2001) 
(arguing that plaintiff’s right of publicity claim violated defendant’s right to free speech and 
expression that is protected under the First Amendment).  
56 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 8:13.  
8
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public.57  Courts have relied on the line between commercial and 
noncommercial speech in defining the common law right of publicity, 
and have denied plaintiff’s right of publicity claims if the use is 
noncommercial speech,58 and granted protection when it has 
constituted commercial speech.59  The need for the balance of these 
two important rights is clear;60 however, courts are still struggling to 
reach a consensus on the precise way to balance these interests fairly.61 
III. BALANCING THE PROTECTIONS: THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
BALANCING TESTS 
A.  The Rogers’ Test 
The first test utilized to find a balance between the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment is the Rogers’ test, which gained 
its name from the case in which it originated, Rogers v. Grimaldi.62  In 
that case, the Second Circuit was faced with a challenge brought by 
Ginger Rogers, an Academy Award winning actress, famous for her 
appearance in a series of motion pictures with her co-star Fred 
 
57 Noncommercial speech such as news is differentiated from commercial speech because 
it provides valuable information to the public and contributes to the marketplace of ideas for 
the public to enjoy. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 8:14-8:15. 
58 G. D. v. Kenny, 15 A.2d 300, 321 (N.J. 2011) (holding that the use of a political aide’s 
criminal history in a campaign flyer, created by public relations at the request of a political 
opponent did not satisfy the commercial element of misappropriation). 
59 White, 971 F.2d at 1398-99 (holding that because defendant’s misappropriation was used 
in an advertisement, the use was implicating commercial interests and therefore constituted a 
violation of the right of publicity); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 
831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that the use of Carson’s name in a commercial product 
constituted infringement on his right of publicity by the defendant). 
60 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977) 
(emphasizing the importance of finding the balance between the two rights and reasoning that 
Zacchini’s economic interest in his performance clearly outweighed the news station’s First 
Amendment defense because it had taken the entire act to unjustly enrich the station); see 
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 
823 (8th Cir. 2007) (analyzing Zacchini as a direction by the Supreme Court that state law 
rights of publicity must be balanced against first amendment considerations). 
61 The Third and Ninth Circuits apply the transformative use test, while the Sixth Circuit 
has applied the Rogers’ test and Missouri Courts have applied the predominant use test. See 
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 166 (3d Cir. 2013); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 
1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003); Doe v. 
TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003). 
62 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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Astaire.63  Rogers brought the action under the Lanham Act64 against 
the defendant company producers and directors of the movie entitled 
“Ginger and Fred” for the use of her name claiming that it was false 
endorsement.  She also claimed the company producers and directors 
violated her common law right of publicity and defamed her and 
violated her common law right of privacy by depicting her in a false 
light.65  The film was about two fictional Italian cabaret performers 
who became known as Ginger and Fred in Italy, but otherwise the 
names had very little to do with either Ginger Rogers or Fred Astaire.66  
The defendants contended that the First Amendment right of free 
expression protected the screenplay.67   
The Second Circuit first formulated a test for Lanham Act 
liability claims, mandating that the Lanham Act should not be invoked 
unless a title has no relevance to the underlying work, or if somewhat 
relevant, is misleading.68  The court reasoned that protecting a title that 
lacks artistic bearing does not advance the interests of the First 
Amendment free expression clause.69  Additionally, it emphasized that 
even if there is a slight relevance, if the work is considered seriously 
misleading the Lanham Act should be invoked.70  Therefore, under this 
test, if a title is found to have at least some artistic relevance and is not 
considered seriously misleading, it will not be a violation.71 
 
63 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989).  Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire 
are a famous film duo known predominantly by their first names, Ginger and Fred. Id. 
64 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (liability for “any person who shall affix, apply, annex, or use in 
connection with any goods or services … a false designation of origin, or any false description 
or representation … and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce”).  
Congress created the Lanham Act in 1946 as a way to register and protect trademarks. In re 
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
65 Rogers, 875 F.2d, at 996-97.  The false light defamation claim is not relevant for purposes 
of this comment. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 997 
68 Id. at 999 (when there are “misleading titles using a celebrity’s name, that balance will 
normally not support application of the [Lanham] Act unless the title has no artistic relevance 
to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title 
explicitly misleads as to the source or content of the work.”). Id.  This test has become known 
as a “relevance test.” Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 788 (D.N.J. 2011). 
69 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1000.  
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/14
2017 THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 1005 
In addition to the Lanham Act test,72 the court formulated a two 
part right of publicity test in order to balance the plaintiff’s rights with 
the defendant’s freedom of expression.73  Under this test, the right of 
publicity bars the use of a celebrity’s name in a title when: (1) the use 
is “wholly unrelated” to the movie; or (2) the use is “simply a disguised 
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”74 
The Second Circuit held that the film title “Ginger and Fred” 
was clearly related to the film, since the main characters were named 
Ginger and Fred.75  Additionally, the court reasoned that the movie title 
was not a disguised commercial advertisement employed to enhance 
sales because it was actually a reflection on the film-maker’s artistic 
expression.76  Therefore, the court held that Rogers’ right of publicity 
was not violated.77  Thus, the first important test for balancing the right 
of publicity protection with First Amendment freedoms was born. 
There are two main flaws presented by the Rogers’ test.  First, 
the Rogers’ right of publicity test mirrors the Lanham Act test, which 
is problematic because, unlike the Lanham Act, the right of publicity 
does not require a showing that consumers are likely to be confused.78  
Thus, the scope of the right of publicity is more expansive than the 
Lanham Act.79  Second, the Rogers’ test has typically been applied in 
cases involving the titles of work,80 and potentially unfit for cases that 
involve broader right of publicity claims.81  
 
72 The Lanham Act test, although not explicitly a right of publicity test, is important for 
analysis in this comment because some courts have described the Lanham Act as the federal 
equivalent of a state right of publicity. See Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 
47, 50 (2006). 
73 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1002.  
74 Id. at 1004. 
75 Id. at 1001.  The title refers directly to the film’s main characters who are known to the 
audience by the names “Ginger and Fred.” Id.  
76 Id. (referencing an affidavit from the filmmaker who explained he purposely used the 
names as a way to satirize the banality of contemporary television). 
77 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1005. 
78 Id. at 1004; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (“any person who … uses in commerce any word, term, 
name, symbol or device … which is likely to cause confusion … shall be liable for such act”). 
See also Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 158 (3d Cir. 2013) (suggesting the weakness 
of applying the Rogers’ trademark-based test to right of publicity actions without accounting 
for the difference). 
79 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004. 
80 See, e.g., Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004 (applying the test to a movie title); Parks v. LaFace 
Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying the test to a song title). 
81 Hart, 717 F.3d at 157 (“We are concerned that this test is a blunt instrument, unfit for 
widespread application in cases that require a carefully calibrated balancing of two 
fundamental protections: the right of free expression and the right to control, manage, and 
11
DiGregorio: The Right of Publicity
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
1006 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
  
B. The Transformative Use Test 
The transformative use test is derived from the first factor of 
the copyright fair use doctrine.82  The California Supreme Court 
adopted this test in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, 
Inc.83  In that case, Comedy III was the owner of all rights to the former 
comedy act known as The Three Stooges, and Saderup was an artist 
recognized for his charcoal drawings of celebrities.84  Saderup 
converted charcoal drawings he had created of The Three Stooges to 
lithographic prints, placed them on t-shirts, and sold the shirts for 
profit.85  Comedy III claimed that the use of the image of The Three 
Stooges violated the Three Stooges’ right of publicity; however, 
Saderup contended that his First Amendment rights of free speech and 
expression would be violated if he were prohibited from creating and 
selling the t-shirts. 86 
The court applied the transformative use test,87 and emphasized 
that the main inquiry is “whether a product containing a celebrity 
likeness is so transformed that it has become the defendant’s own 
expression rather the celebrity’s likeness.”88  Moreover, the court 
recommended that in close cases, when determining whether a use is 
sufficiently transformative, the court should look to the root of the 
 
profit from one’s own identity.”); see also Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (recognizing that not many courts extended the Rogers’ test beyond a title of a 
work); see also Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1281-82 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(acknowledging that even the 6th Circuit, which originally adopted the Rogers’ test, later used 
the transformative use test). 
82 The court derived the test from the first factor for the copyright fair use doctrine 
recognizing that the factor was “particularly pertinent to the task of reconciling the rights of 
free expression and publicity.”  Comedy III Prodc., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 
404 (2001).  In copyright, the transformative use test focuses on “whether the new work merely 
supersedes the objects of the original creation, … or instead adds something new, with a 
further purpose or character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.” 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).   
83 25 Cal. 4th 387 (2001). 
84 Id. at 393. 
85 Id. 
86 Id.   
87 The transformative use test, similar to the transformative use test in copyright law, 
focuses on whether and to what extent the new work has added something more to the work 
or created a new purpose for the work. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
88 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406.  The court also phrased the test as, “whether the celebrity 
likeness is one of the raw materials from which an original work is synthesized, or whether 
the depiction or imitation is the very sum and substance of the work in question.” Id. 
12
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economic value of the work.89  If the value of the work comes from a 
source other than the depicted celebrity, such as the artistic ability of 
the creator, then a right of publicity would generally not be 
implicated.90  Using this test, the court held that Saderup’s realistic 
depictions of The Three Stooges were not transformative and therefore 
not entitled to First Amendment protections.91 
The transformative use test has been subject to criticism since 
it was adopted.92  One leading commentator on the right of publicity 
described the test as vague and unhelpful.93  Additionally, as another 
legal scholar emphasized, the test does not provide objective 
guidelines, and as a result encourages judges to take the role of art 
critics, which may cause a subjective determination based on the fame 
of the artist.94  Moreover, even the Comedy III court itself recognized 
that the distinction between protected and unprotected expression, 
under the transformative use test, is very “subtle.”95  Thus, the 
transformative use test puts substantial weight on the expressiveness 
of the creation, and does not account for the potential commercial 
exploitation of a celebrity in a work.96  Although a creation may be 
very expressive, the creator is still exploiting a celebrity’s identity in 
his artwork without permission, which should also be considered when 
balancing the right of publicity with the freedom of expression. 
C. Predominant Use Test 
The third test is the predominant use test. The Missouri 
Supreme Court rejected both the Rogers’ test and the transformative 
 
89 Id. at 407. 
90 Id. (reasoning that when the value of the work comes from a source other than the fame 
of the celebrity, the work is presumed to have sufficient transformative elements to warrant a 
First Amendment defense). 
91 Id. at 409 (holding that the literal depictions of The Three Stooges substantially exploited 
their fame, and that the economic value of his work derived from the fame of the celebrities). 
92 Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-
Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 493 (2003) (noting that the 
transformative use test can be problematic). 
93 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 8:71-§ 8:72 (emphasizing that “difficulty of application 
and incertitude of result are the hallmarks of the court’s transformative test.”). 
94 David Tan, Political Recording of the Contemporary Celebrity and the First Amendment, 
2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 25-26 (2011).  
95 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 811. 
96 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003). Under the transformative use 
test, a work that is created for the sole purpose of commercially exploiting a celebrity’s identity 
is not actionable if it is found sufficiently transformed in expression.  Id. 
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use test, and adopted a “more balanced predominant use test.”97  In 
Doe. TCI Cablevision, Anthony “Tony” Twist, a former National 
Hockey League player, sued the defendants for alleged use of his 
identity in a comic book series.98  The series contained a villain named 
“Tony Twist Twistelli,” who was characterized as a tough guy, similar 
to the plaintiff.99   
In its holding, the court adopted the predominant use test, 
which stated that if a product being sold “predominantly exploits the 
commercial value of an individual’s identity, that product should be 
held to violate the right of publicity.”100  Conversely, if the purpose of 
the product is predominantly to make an expressive comment or 
statement, it should be allotted greater protection.101  In applying this 
test, the court found that the use of the plaintiff’s identity was 
predominantly to boost product sales,102 and not to create an artistic 
expression, and therefore “free speech must give way to the right of 
publicity.”103  
The problem with the predominant use test is that, while trying 
to include actions that would otherwise be dismissed under the Rogers’ 
or transformative use tests,104 it does not provide guidance for uses that 
are simultaneously commercial and expressive.105  This is problematic 
because although speech that is deemed to be fully expressional speech 
is granted greater protection under the First Amendment freedom of 
 
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 365. 
99 Id. at 366 (recognizing that the fictional and real Tony are only similar in nickname and 
characteristic, and did not have physical resemblance).  
100 Doe, 110 S.W.3d.at 374 (emphasizing that even if the product contains some expressive 
content, and might otherwise qualify as speech, it should not be protected by the First 
Amendment when the predominant purpose is to exploit the commercial value of the 
celebrity). 
101 Id. This differs from the transformative use test which focuses on the expressive nature 
of the work itself; however, the predominant use test determines the prevailing purpose 
intended with the exploitation of the celebrity’s identity, not the extent it has been transformed.  
102 Id. (stating that “the metaphorical reference to Twist, though a literary device, has very 
little value compared to its commercial value.”). 
103 Id.  
104 Id. (cautioning that the tests preclude actions whenever a use is expressive, regardless of 
the commercial exploitation). 
105 The first step in the predominant use test is to determine if the predominant purpose of 
the work is to exploit commercial value of the celebrity.  If the court finds that this is in fact 
the predominant purpose of the work, according to Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374, it should not be 
afforded protection under the First Amendment.  Pursuant to this analysis, the court will never 
even consider the expressive nature of the work. 
14
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expression, not all speech is purely expressional.106  Many times a 
work or expression will fall somewhere between the spectrum of 
commercial and expressive and therefore the use must be balanced 
properly with competing rights.107  Additionally the predominant use 
test is vulnerable to the subjectivity of the judges.108  It requires judges 
to act as art critics and determine the level of the expressiveness that a 
particular work has.109  It is not proper for courts to discern the artistic 
elements of a work.110   
The transformative use test is currently the test used in a 
majority of circuits.111  Thus, this test has been deemed to be the least 
problematic of the three, even in light of the aforementioned 
problems.112 
IV. COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE 
A. Copyright Law 
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to 
enact the copyright law for the purpose of promoting science and 
fostering the creation of ideas.113  Congress, pursuant to this power, 
enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, and granted exclusive rights to 
original works of authorship.114  The purpose of the Copyright Act is 
 
106  Michael Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc. & Super Valu, Inc., WL 12-1992, 3 (2014). 
(Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern 
Division) (recognizing that expressional speech grants more protection than commercial 
speech, but there can be speech which is a mix of both). 
107 Id. 
108 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that “the predominant 
use test is subjective at best, arbitrary at worst”). 
109 Id. (cautioning that a judge cannot act as both an impartial jurist and a discerning art 
critic). 
110 Id. (recognizing that it is improper for “courts to analyze select elements of a work to 
determine how much they contribute to the entire work’s expressiveness.”). 
111 The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits use the transformative use test. See Hart, 717 F.3d 
at 163; ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Company, 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Keller v. Elec. 
Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013). 
112 See supra notes 92-96.  
113 U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 8 (“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”).  
114 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016) (“Copyright protection … subsists in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression); id. at § 106 (“The owner of a 
copyright under this title has exclusive rights.”).  The exclusive rights enable a copyright 
holder to have the ability to reproduce and distribute copies of their works, prepare derivatives 
based on the original, and to perform or display or transmit the work publicly. Id. 
15
DiGregorio: The Right of Publicity
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
1010 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
  
to promote creation and distribute the creative works to the public.115  
The exclusive rights enhance the goal of the Copyright Act by 
providing authors with protection for their creativity and investment, 
and with an incentive to create more works by guaranteeing 
availability to the public.116  However, these exclusive rights can also 
hinder the goals of the Copyright Act by creating a monopoly over the 
creations, thus preventing access to preexisting works.117  Authors and 
creators depend on the works of others in order to create their own 
individualized works.118  Thus, there is a strong desire to balance the 
tension between protecting exclusive rights and the public’s need to 
access preexisting works.119  The framers of the Constitution 
recognized that while providing authors with control of their creations 
provided incentive to continue creating, they also needed to ensure that 
society could benefit from the availability of these creations, and 
therefore they mandated that the copyright protection be “for limited 
times.”120  Accordingly, acting on this constitutional command, 
Congress placed limitations on the exclusive rights, including a fair 
use limitation.121 
 
115 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (stating that the goal of the Copyright Act 
is to disseminate creative works to the public). 
116 Tina Ham, The Right of Publicity: Finding a Balance in the Fair Use Doctrine – 
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 543, 561 (2003) referencing 
CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 13, 333 (5th ed. 2001) (“As reward for [author’s] 
contribution to the storehouse of human knowledge, she receives ownership of a copyright in 
the work.”). 
117 Randall T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 813 (1988). 
118 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (“in truth, in 
literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract 
sense, are strictly new and original throughout.)”.  For example, 2 Live Crew, a rap group, 
used a preexisting country song to create a parodied rap song. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
119 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphasizing that 
the overall objectives of copyright law are to “expand public knowledge and understanding” 
by providing an “incentive to create informative, intellectually enriching works for public 
consumption.”). 
120 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
121 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. 2001) (“Limitation on exclusive rights: … the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any 
other means specified by that section, for purposes of criticism, comment, news, reporting, 
teaching, scholarship, or research is not an infringement of copyright.”).  Fair Use Doctrine is 
also accepted in common law precedents.  See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569; Stewart 
16
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B.  Comparison of Copyright Law and The Right of 
Publicity 
 
Copyright law and the right of publicity share some similar 
purposes.122  While copyright law grants exclusive rights to authors of 
original creations, the right of publicity grants a celebrity the exclusive 
right to his identity.123  Both copyright law and the right of publicity 
provide incentives for creativity while benefitting public welfare.124  
Additionally, both copyright law and the right of publicity ensure that 
the “creators” will be able to reap the rewards from their endeavors.125 
While copyright law and the right of publicity naturally have 
undeniable similarities,126 their differences cannot be ignored when 
altering the fair use doctrine of copyright protection to fit the right of 
 
v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539 (1985). 
122 See infra notes 123-25. 
123 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting copyright owners the exclusive rights to reproduce, prepare 
derivatives, distribute copies, and to perform, display, or transmit publicly).  Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995) (granting an exclusive right to celebrities of their 
identities by prohibiting the appropriation of the commercial value of a person’s identity). See 
also Coyne, supra note 117, at 814 (“If copyright grants exclusive rights in creative works, the 
right of publicity grants exclusive rights in personal attributes.”). 
124 Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228 (stating that the goal of the Copyright Act is to disseminate 
creative works to the public); Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 
805 F.2d 663, 678 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The reason that state law protects individual pecuniary 
interests is to provide an incentive to performers to invest the time and resources required to 
develop such performances.”); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 
576 (1977) (“Ohio’s decision to protect petitioner’s right of publicity here rests on more than 
a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort invested in his act; the protection 
provides an economic incentive for him to make an investment required to produce a 
performance of interest to the public.  This same consideration underlies the patent and 
copyrights laws long enforced by this court.”). 
125 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.  The Court in Zacchini recognized the importance of the 
ability of a performer to capitalize from the very activity that made him famous in the first 
place, and emphasized that this was the very essence of the right of publicity protection.  Id. 
See also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (Alcaron, 
J., dissenting) (emphasizing the need to protect and reward the work and investment of those 
who create intellectual property). 
126 See supra notes 123-25. 
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publicity policies.  The most obvious is that right of publicity protects 
the identity of a person, while copyright protects works that have been 
fixed in tangible form.  While the right of publicity can protect a sound, 
such as a celebrity voice127 or a nickname,128 copyright protection is 
only afforded to an original expression of an idea in tangible form, but 
not to the idea itself.129  Courts have expressed wariness in applying a 
wholesale incorporation of the copyright fair use doctrine to right of 
publicity law without compensating for the differences.130 
C. Copyright Fair Use Doctrine 
The Fair Use Doctrine acts as a balance between the interests 
of individual authors and the interests of the public by limiting the 
potential of copyright monopolies.131  The doctrine allows for the fair 
use of copyrighted works “to fulfill copyright’s purpose To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”132 and, to advance 
copyright’s goal to provide protection to authors and inventors and 
simultaneously permit others to use protected works to advance the 
progress of arts and sciences.133  As noted by Justice Story, “every 
book in literature, science, and art, borrows, and must borrow, and use 
much which was well known and used before.”134  The Fair Use 
Doctrine allows for this evolution of creation in literature, science, and 
art in a way that still provides protection to original creators. 
 
127 Kirby, infra notes 221-23. 
128 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(granting relief to Carson for the unauthorized use of the phrase “Here’s Johnny”). 
129 17 U.S.C. § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists … in original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression ….”). 
130 Comedy III Prodc., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 404 (Cal. 2001) 
(expressing the belief that some copyright fair use factors are designed to apply to the partial 
copying of works and will not be helpful in “determining whether the depiction of a celebrity 
is protected by the First Amendment.”). 
131 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (“The Copyright Act … creates a balance 
between the artist’s right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and 
the public’s need for access to creative works.”). 
132 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994); Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, 
cl. 8. 
133 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing that 
while authors are important intended beneficiaries of copyright, the public is also an important 
beneficiary). 
134 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)). 
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The Fair Use Doctrine is an affirmative defense to copyright 
infringement actions.135  It “provides [and requires] courts to avoid 
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would 
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”136  The 
doctrine requires a case-by-case analysis,137 and calls for all four 
factors of the doctrine to be explored and weighed together in light of 
the purposes of copyright.138 
The first factor in the fair use analysis is “the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”139  The statute 
provides examples that guide the court in making a determination 
under this factor.140  Courts look to see whether the work merely 
“supersedes” or “supplants” the original creation,141 or if the work is 
“transformative.”142  If a court finds that the use is transformative, then 
this factor will weigh in favor of the defense.143  
The transformative use determination is the most important 
part of the court’s analysis of the first factor;144 however, finding 
transformative use is not absolutely necessary.145  Courts also consider 
the commerciality of the work, deciding whether it serves a 
commercial use, or some other purpose.146  In general, a work that is 
 
135 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
136 Id. at 577, quoting Stewart, 495 U.S. at 236. 
137 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560;  
138 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78 (stating that the four factors enumerated in the statute are 
non-exclusive and provide only “general guidance;” they are “to be explored and weighed 
together in light of the purposes of copyright.”). 
139 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. 2001). 
140 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. 2001) (“the fair use of a copyrighted work … for purposes such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright”). 
141 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; accord Harper & Row, 471 U.S at 562.  
142 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.  A work is transformative if it adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message. Id.  
143 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 217 (2d Cir. 2015).  The court 
held that Google’s use of copyrighted books was highly transformative because it changed the 
copyrighted books into comprehensive word indexes, providing scholars with a helpful way 
to identify books, and adding value to the basic transformative search function. Id. 
144 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that 
“the concept of ‘transformative use’ is central to a proper analysis under the first factor”). See 
also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (stating that the more transformative the new work is the less 
significant the other factors will be). 
145 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984).   
146 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. 2015). 
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commercial tends to weigh against a fair use finding;147 however, a 
commercial element in the use alone does not conclusively bar fair 
use.148  
The second factor in the fair use determination is the nature of 
the copyrighted work.149  The primary considerations here are whether 
the work is fiction or non-fiction, or published or non-published.150  
Additionally, this factor recognizes that some works are closer to the 
intention of copyright protection than others, and tries to ensure that 
those works will be protected.151  A work that is creative in nature 
weighs against fair use, while factual works receive less protection.152  
The third factor in the fair use analysis is the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as 
a whole.153  The primary inquiry here is whether the quality and the 
quantity of the copied material are reasonable in relation to the purpose 
of the copied use.154  The court considers “the degree to which the work 
 
147 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court emphasized that 
“every commercial use is presumptively … unfair ….” 464 U.S. at 451.  Courts later clarified 
that the mere commercial character of a use does not bar a finding of fairness. Campbell, 510 
U.S. at 584; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
148 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (emphasizing that commercial nature is but one of four 
important factors in determining fair use); see also Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 219 
(recognizing that Google undoubtedly had a profit motivation, but this motivation did not deny 
a fair use defense). 
149 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). The second factor is the least helpful factor in determining fair use 
and is rarely found to be determinative. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (stating that the factor is 
not likely much help in any case when separating the “fair use sheep from the infringing 
goats”); Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 220 (noting that the second factor rarely plays a significant 
role in fair use determination); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2d Cir. 2013) (making the 
distinction that the factor is particularly useless in actions where the work of art is being used 
for a transformative purpose).   
150 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (recognizing that whether a work is 
published is critical to its nature under factor two because the scope of fair use is narrower 
with respect to unpublished works).  
151 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. See, e.g., Stewart, 495 U.S. at 237-38 (contrasting fictional 
short stories with factual works); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563-64 (contrasting soon-to-be-
published memoir with published speech); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (contrasting motion pictures with news broadcasts); Feist 
Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348-51 (1985) (contrasting 
creative works with bare factual compilations). 
152 There is a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy, and 
these factual works are more susceptible to a finding of fair use. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; 
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563-64; Stewart, 495 U.S. at 237-38. 
153 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
154 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87 (suggesting that no more than what is necessary should 
be taken).  
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may serve as a market substitute for the original.”155  Moreover, a 
majority of courts have held that even when a work has been copied in 
its entirety, it may still be fair use.156  For example, a complete copying 
of a work can be appropriate in instances where there is a 
transformative purpose.157  Additionally, when determining whether 
the copying was qualitatively substantial, the court looks to see 
whether the heart of the original was used and made into the heart of 
the new work.158   
The fourth factor is the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.159  The purpose of this 
factor is to protect copyright owners against uses that would cause 
economic harm.160  Courts look not only at the extent of the market 
harm to the original, but also to potential derivative works,161 because 
the licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to 
creation.162  However, courts must be sure to consider only those 
derivative markets that the creators would in general develop.163  When 
a work is not transformative and is merely a duplicate of the original, 
substantial market harm can occur because the work may act as a 
 
155 Id. at 587-88. 
156 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984).  
157 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing that 
“complete unchanged copying has repeatedly been found justified as fair use when the copying 
was reasonably appropriate to the copier’s transformative purpose”); see also Campbell, 510 
U.S. 569 at 587 (holding that a parody’s humor comes from the ability to recognize the original 
through the imitation, and thus even though the parody is exact copying, it is reasonable to the 
extent that it was meant to parody the original). 
158 Id. (reasoning that “a work composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with 
little added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding use” and favors protection 
for the original); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-68 
(1985) (emphasizing that even though the Nation had only taken 300 words from President 
Ford’s memoirs, the significance of the quotations amounted to the heart of the book, the part 
that was likely to be newsworthy and important in licensing). 
159 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
160 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
161 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (“the inquiry must take account not only of harm to the 
original but also of harm to the market for derivative works.”). 
162 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592; see 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (copyright owners have exclusive 
rights “to prepare derivative works”). 
163 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (recognizing that there is no protectable derivative market for 
criticism because it is unlikely that the creator of a work would license critical reviews of his 
own product). 
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market replacement.164  However, a transformative use that provides a 
different function from the original favors a finding of fair use.165 
As previously mentioned, copyright law and the right of 
publicity share similar purposes.166  Both grant the creators exclusive 
rights and provide incentives for creativity.167  Additionally, both areas 
of law have experienced conflicts with the competing First 
Amendment freedom of expression interests.168  Thus, while some 
courts have expressed wariness of a wholesale adoption of the 
copyright fair use factors,169 these above factors, when altered to 
accommodate right of publicity law, would be critical in balancing the 
First Amendment with the right of publicity. 
V. FACTORS FOR THE PROPOSED FAIR USE – RIGHT OF 
 
164 Id. at 591 (reasoning that a transformative use is less likely to serve as a market 
substitution).  
165 Id.  Accordingly, in Authors Guild, the court found that Google Books was not likely to 
harm the market for books because it does not replace the books, it merely scans them.  The 
scan does not replace the physical book, but rather utilizes it and creates an additional 
beneficial use of the physical book.  Additionally, it found that Google Books actually 
enhances the sale of books because it acts similarly to an in-store book display and provides 
researchers with a way to identify books for purchase. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 
F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015). 
166 See supra notes 123-25. 
167 17 U.S.C. § 106 (this section grants copyright owners the exclusive rights to reproduce, 
prepare derivatives, distribute copies, and to perform, display, or transmit publicly).  
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995) (grants exclusive right to celebrities 
of their identities by prohibiting the appropriation of the commercial value of a person’s 
identity). See also Coyne, supra note 117, at 814 (“If copyright grants exclusive rights in 
creative works, the right of publicity grants exclusive rights in personal attributes.”). 
168 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) 
(recognizing that the Copyright Act must be balanced with the First Amendment); Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977) (emphasizing the importance 
of balancing the right of publicity and the First Amendment). 
169 Comedy III Prodc., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 404 (2001) (expressing 
the belief that some copyright fair use factors are designed to apply to the partial copying of 
works and will not be helpful in “determining whether the depiction of a celebrity is protected 
by the First Amendment.”). 
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PUBLICITY DOCTRINE 
A. Adjusting the Factors 
The incorporation of copyright fair use factors to right of 
publicity law has been suggested by scholars in the past.170  While 
some believe that this would be beneficial, others do not think that it 
would provide the best solution to balancing the competing First 
Amendment and right of publicity rights.171  This comment, however, 
offers a new solution, and in addition to adjusted fair use factors, 
proposes a fifth factor, which utilizes the likelihood of confusion test 
for right of publicity actions coined by the Second Circuit in the 
Rogers’ case.172  This helps to bridge the gap between the expansive 
right of publicity protection and the more confined Lanham Act 
protection,173 and incorporates the important considerations of the 
Lanham Act, which is also frequently asserted in right of publicity 
actions.174 
1. The Nature of the Use 
The prima facie case for a violation of the right of publicity 
requires a showing of commerciality,175 and therefore, this factor will 
not focus on whether the use is of commercial nature, as in the first 
 
170 See generally Tina Ham, The Right of Publicity: Finding a Balance in the Fair Use 
Doctrine – Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 543, 561 (2003); 
Randall T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 29 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 781, 813 (1988); Michael Schoenberger, Unnecessary Roughness: 
Reconciling Hart and Keller with a Fair Use Standard Benefitting the Right of Publicity, 45 
CONN. L. REV. 1875, 1879 (2013). 
171 MCCARTHY, supra note 262, at § 8:38. 
172 See supra notes 68-71. 
173 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 158 (3d Cir. 2013) (suggesting the weakness of 
applying the Rogers’ trademark-based test to right of publicity actions without accounting for 
the differences between the two actions). 
174 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(plaintiff brought an action for a violation of her right of publicity and a violation under the 
Lanham Act); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 
1983) (plaintiff brought the action alleging violation of his right of publicity and the Lanham 
Act). 
175 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 3:2 (stating that the prima facie case for a right of 
publicity is: 1- the plaintiff “owns an enforceable right in the identity or persona”; 2 – 
“defendant, without permission, used some aspect of the identity in such a way that plaintiff 
is identifiable from defendant’s use;” and the use is “likely to cause damage to the commercial 
value of that persona.”). 
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factor of the copyright fair use doctrine, and will instead focus heavily 
on whether the use is transformative.176  However, similar to the first 
factor of the copyright fair use doctrine, creations that are for criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, generally 
will not constitute misappropriation.177   
Since most misappropriations in the right of publicity area do 
not fall cleanly into one of those categories, courts must determine the 
expressiveness of the misappropriations, and determine whether the 
use was transformative enough to not violate a celebrity’s right of 
publicity.178  Thus, this factor embraces the transformative use test 
derived from Comedy III and adopted by the Third and Ninth Circuits 
for state law right of publicity claims.179  However, because the test is 
now a factor in an affirmative defense, it will no longer be dispositive 
as it was in the Third and Ninth Circuit cases.180  Instead, similar to the 
first factor of the copyright fair use doctrine,181 there is an emphasis on 
the degree to which the new expression is transformative.182  If the use 
 
176 The first factor in copyright fair use doctrine specifies a determination of whether the 
use was commercial. 17 U.S.C. 107(1) (“including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes”).  This factor for the right of publicity fair use 
doctrine will instead focus on the most important determination under the first factor, which 
is whether the use was transformative.  See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 
913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that “the concept of ‘transformative use’ is central to a 
proper analysis under the first factor”); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
579 (1994) (stating that the more transformative the new work is the less significant the other 
factors will be). 
177 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“The fair use of a copyrighted work … for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, 
or research, is not an infringement of copyright”).  In Campbell, the Court emphasized that the 
examples are “illustrative and not limitative” and “provide only a general guidance about the 
sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly have found to be fair uses.” 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.  The same emphasis should be applied in the Right of Publicity 
Defense; the categories provide only general guidance. 
178 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (recognizing the need for a case-by-case analysis and not 
a bright-line rule). 
179 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153 (3d Cir. 2013) (adopting the transformative 
use test because it was “flexible – yet uniformly applicable”); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 
F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming the decision of the district court which utilized the 
transformative use test). 
180 Hart, 717 F.3d at 163; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276. 
181 See supra note 144. 
182 This is similar to the transformative use concept in the copyright fair use doctrine.  Just 
as in copyright, this test focuses on the degree to which a work is transformative, and finds 
that “the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors.” 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
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is highly transformative,183 then the factor will weigh towards fair 
use.184   
Notably, the Seventh Circuit has questioned the importance of 
the transformative use test under the first factor of a copyright fair use 
determination.185  The Seventh Circuit fears that such a strong 
emphasis on whether a use is transformative might diminish the 
importance of the statutory factors.186  Instead, in its copyright fair use 
analysis the court determines whether a use is complementary to the 
protected work, which is allowed, or a substitute, which is not 
permitted.187  However, the Second Circuit has subsequently criticized 
the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning,188 and reiterated the importance of the 
transformative use test in all copyright fair use determinations.189  
Thus, this first factor, despite the criticism of the Seventh Circuit in 
copyright law,190 includes an emphasis on the degree to which the new 
expression is transformative.191  
Moreover, this factor incorporates the predominant use test, 
using the same concept of deterring the commercial exploitation of a 
celebrity’s identity,192 but making it less harsh for those creators who 
did not intend to capitalize from the use.  Thus, this factor also 
acknowledges that although an identity may have been utilized in a 
creation, the creator in this instance is no longer receiving a 
commercial benefit from the celebrity’s identity, which presumably is 
part of this new work, but is instead profiting from the new creation 
itself. 
 
183 A work is transformative if it adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with a new meaning.  Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
186 Id.  
187 Id. 
188 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216, n.18 (2d Cir. 2015). 
189 Id. 
190 Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758. 
191 The transformative use test has been recognized as an important test in right of publicity 
law since its creation in Comedy III, and has since been adopted as the dispositive test in the 
Third and Ninth Circuits. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153 (3d Cir. 2013) (adopting 
the transformative use test because it was “flexible – yet uniformly applicable”); Keller v. 
Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming the decision of the district court 
which utilized the transformative use test). 
192 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003), supra notes 101-03. 
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2.  Nature of the Publicity Right  
This factor is notably different from the factor in the copyright 
fair use doctrine.  In copyright, the factor focuses on whether the work 
is published/non-published, or fiction/non-fiction.193  However, in the 
right of publicity, this factor focuses on the amount of work a celebrity 
dedicated to establishing his famed identity.  The factor builds on the 
reasoning in Zacchini, in which the Supreme Court recognized that a 
celebrity should be able to reap the benefits of his own labor.194  This 
factor can be considered to mirror the “sweat of the brow” theory,195 
emphasizing that an individual should be able to benefit from the 
efforts he exercised to establish a famous identity.196  Accordingly, as 
one legal scholar noted, “while one person may build a home, and 
another knit a sweater so also may a third create a valuable 
personality.”197  An individual, under this factor, is incentivized to 
create a celebrity identity through his own efforts, instead of having 
one thrust upon him.  The more effort a celebrity has put into achieving 
the status of fame, the less this factor will lean towards fair use.198   
Thus, this factor is measured by determining whether the 
publicity was earned, which encompasses those celebrities who 
dedicate their time and effort to establish their fame, or whether the 
publicity was incidental, which includes those whose fame is thrust 
 
193 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990). 
194 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (reasoning that 
because the press broadcasted Zacchini’s entire performance, it hindered his ability to earn a 
living as a performer).  The very essence of right of publicity protection is that a performer be 
able to capitalize from the very activity that made him famous in the first place. Id. 
195 Sweat of the brow is the underlying policy of the unjust enrichment justification.  It 
emphasizes that an individual is entitled to the ownership of his own creation.  MCCARTHY, 
supra note 12, at § 2:5.  The “sweat of the brow” theory has been discredited for copyright 
protection because it distinctly goes against a “fundamental axiom of copyright law – that no 
one may copyright facts or ideas.” Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 352-56 (1985). 
196 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574 (holding that there is no social purpose served by allowing an 
individual to get free some aspect of another that would otherwise have market value and 
would normally induce a profit).  See also Nimmer, supra note 17, at 216 (emphasizing that 
an individual is “entitled to the fruits of his own labors”). 
197 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at §§ 2.1; 2.6. 
198 Coyne, supra note 117 (when a celebrity “persona is entirely of his own creation, his 
publicity rights deserve more protection”). 
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upon them by the public and media.199  As one legal scholar noted, an 
individual who attains fame “through sheer luck … public scandal, or 
… grossly immoral conduct” should not receive the same publicity 
protection as those who have earned their fame.200  A celebrity who 
has earned his fame, in the eyes of the public, has attained a higher 
quality of fame as opposed to one who has had fame thrust upon them, 
and thus the quality of the earned celebrity’s identity is greater and 
should be adequately protected.201  Accordingly, the earned/incidental 
publicity determination accounts for the fact that not all celebrities 
achieve fame through their own efforts.202  
For example, under this second factor, a celebrity such as 
Michael Phelps,203 who has gone through extensive training and hard 
work to get to where he is today, 204 represents a celebrity with earned 
publicity.  In the public eye, Michael Phelps has achieved a high-
quality identity as a result of his Olympic achievements.205  On the 
other hand, Kylie Jenner, who has become famous from her role on the 
reality TV show that films her family,206 embodies a celebrity falling 
in the incidental publicity category.  While many people recognize 
Kylie Jenner as a celebrity, and even buy her makeup products within 
minutes of their release,207 the quality of her identity is less than  
Michael Phelps’ because of the way it was achieved.   
 
199 See Schoenberg, supra note 19, at 1912 (suggesting that the best way to differentiate 
between the two publicity rights is to classify them as either active or passive and weigh the 
factor accordingly).   
200 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of a Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 179 (1993).  
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 184 (arguing that to believe that a celebrity’s fame is entirely the result of his own 
labors is the “folklore of celebrity;” when in reality, celebrities owe much of their fame to 
social factors and other individuals who contributed to creating the value of their identities). 
203 Michael Phelps is an Olympic Swimmer who has won 18 gold medals. Michael Phelps, 
SWIMSWAM,  https://swimswam.com/bio/michael-phelps/#medals (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
204 Michael Phelps, SWIMSWAM, https://swimswam.com/bio/michael-phelps/ (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2017). 
205 Id. 
206 Kylie Jenner Fires Back at Critics Says She Deserves to Be on List of Influential Teens, 
ABC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/kylie-jenner-fires-back-
critics-deserves-list-influential/story?id=34856680. 
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Notably, Michael Phelps has had his own episodes of public 
scandal.208  In 2014, Phelps was even suspended from his Olympic 
training by the USA Swimming team for six months because of his 
public scandal.209  However, for the purposes of this factor, this public 
scandal would not reduce the high-quality level of publicity that Phelps 
has achieved.  Phelps’s publicity originated from his Olympic 
achievements,210 which as noted above, fall within the earned publicity 
category.211  Although a celebrity may encounter some negative 
publicity throughout his or her career, this factor focuses on the origin 
of the publicity, and thus, any publicity, be it positive or negative after 
the celebrity has become famous in the eyes of the public, does not 
affect this factor. 
Both Michael Phelps and Kylie Jenner are celebrities with 
known identities that would generate commercial value when 
misappropriated.212  However, under this factor, the level of publicity 
protection is greater when a celebrity dedicates his life to achieve such 
fame and creates high quality fame.213  In contrast, when the celebrity 
did not invest as much into achieving fame, the identity represents a 
lesser quality and the factor will lean more towards fair use. 
3. Substantiality of the Misappropriation 
For this factor, the court evaluates the extent of the 
misappropriation.214  Unlike copyright, the application of this factor 
 
208 In 2014 Michael Phelps was charged with his second Driving Under the Influence 
offense.  After this, he entered a six-week in-patient rehabilitation program. Michael Phelps 
suspended by USA Swimming for six months, CNN (Oct. 7, 2014), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/06/sport/michael-phelps-suspended/.  
209 Id. 
210 Michael Phelps, SWIMSWAM, https://swimswam.com/bio/michael-phelps/ (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2017). 
211 See supra notes 204-05. 
212 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing 
that the more popular a celebrity becomes, the easier it is to evoke her identity, and the more 
attractive the celebrity is to advertisers, and as a result the identities of the most popular 
celebrities should be afforded ample protection from advertisers). 
213 See supra note 198; see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic 
Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 540–541 (concluding that a “defendant’s expressive use … cannot 
be divorced from the value the plaintiff’s efforts have given to it”). 
214 Schoenberger, supra note 19, at 1913. 
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emphasizes the quantity of the expression rather than the quality.215  
The court in Comedy III emphasized that courts should not be 
concerned with the quality of the artistic work at issue,216 but instead 
the question should be “whether the literal and imitative or the 
expressive elements predominate a work.”217  This reasoning has been 
reiterated by subsequent court decisions, recognizing that judges 
should not act as art critics.218  
Moreover, similar to the reasoning of Comedy III, that the 
determination should be whether the product using a celebrity’s 
identity has been transformed in a way that causes it to be primarily 
the creator’s own expression,219 this factor considers the work in 
question as a whole when defining the extent of the misappropriation.   
The California Appellate Court is at the forefront of this 
reasoning.  Two influential cases regarding right of publicity 
protection in video games applied this reasoning using the 
transformative use test, and considered aspects of the games that were 
not part of the celebrity’s physical identity in their determinations.220  
In both cases, a celebrity’s identity was fashioned into a video game 
character without their permission.221  To determine if these games 
should be afforded First Amendment protection, both courts 
considered the extent of this misappropriation when viewed as a whole 
in the video games.222  Neither court focused on the artistic nature or 
the quality of the character of the video game, but rather they 
 
215 See supra note 158 (stressing that in the qualitative determination, courts look to see if 
the “heart of the work” was taken).  In the copyright fair use determination, even if a work is 
copied in its entirety, it may still be afforded fair use protection. Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984).  
216 Comedy III Prodc., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 407 (2001) (noting that 
even vulgar expressions qualify for First Amendment protection). 
217 Id. 
218 See supra note 94; see also supra note 109. 
219 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406.  
220 Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (2006); No Doubt v. Activision, 
Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011).  
221 Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 51 (explaining that the plaintiff was a famous singer who 
alleged the defendant video game producer based a character in the game on her identity); No 
Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1024 (stating that the plaintiffs were famous musicians alleging 
the defendant used their identities in the video game, Band Hero). 
222 Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 59 (emphasizing that the fictional space setting and role of 
the character in the game as a space-age reporter in the 21st century was not a misappropriation 
of the celebrity who was actually a famous singer); No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1033 
(finding that the video game characters who were portrayed as musicians were exact replicas 
of the celebrities themselves and therefore was an extensive misappropriation by the 
defendant). 
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considered what quantity of each celebrity’s identity was 
misappropriated.223  
In Kirby v. Sega of America Inc.,224 the court found that the 
First Amendment protected the video game’s use of the celebrity’s 
identity,225 and that although the video game character was undeniably 
a spin-off of the famous celebrity singer,226 the quantity of these 
similarities was outweighed by the dissimilar attributes.227  However, 
in No Doubt v. Activision Inc.,228 the court found that the First 
Amendment did not protect a video game’s use of the celebrities’ 
identities because the characters and the setting in which they were 
used were all exact replicas of the celebrities.229  Thus, the extent of 
the misappropriation was very great.230  
Kirby and No Doubt were correct in their reasoning and 
together provide a basis for the application of this factor.  Therefore, 
under this factor, if the expressive elements of a work overpower the 
literal or imitative aspects, thereby limiting the extent of the 
misappropriation, the factor will favor fair use.231  However, if the 
quantity of the copying of a celebrity’s identity outweighs the 
expressive elements, the factor will weigh against fair use. 
4. The Effect of the Use on the Potential Market 
The fourth factor in this affirmative defense asks whether the 
misappropriation affects the celebrity’s use of her own identity on the 
potential market or licensing market.  This is similar to the fourth factor 
in the copyright fair use doctrine,232 which the Supreme Court 
 
223 See supra note 222. 
224 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (2006). 
225 Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 59. 
226 Id. at 55-56. (listing the similarities of Kirby and Ulala, including body and eye shape, 
lip and hair color, clothing, and even catch phrases). 
227 Id. at 59. 
228 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011). 
229 No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1033. 
230 Id. 
231 This factor utilizes the reasoning of the courts in both Kirby and No Doubt, which both 
weigh the extent of the celebrities’ identity, including the settings in which a celebrity was 
found, in their reasoning.  See also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 
(9th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing that while the robot with blonde hair and white dress alone may 
not be extensive misappropriation, when coupled with the setting of the Wheel of Fortune 
game show, it was an obvious and all-embracing misappropriation of the celebrity identity). 
232 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).   
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described stating, “a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the 
publicity market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be 
prohibited in order to protect the author’s incentive to create.”233   
The scope for which a celebrity can suffer a commercial injury 
expands from a simple misappropriation of a celebrity’s reputation,234 
and extends to the appropriation of an entire work that correlates with 
a celebrity’s identity.235  According to the Restatement, courts should 
analyze the market effect “in light of the informational or creative 
comment of the defendant’s use.”236  For example, in Zacchini, where 
the defendant news company misappropriated Zacchini’s entire human 
cannonball performance, the commercial use lacked any creative 
comment, and the commercial harm therefore was extensive.237   
Additionally, just as a court under the fourth factor in the 
copyright fair use doctrine looks to derivative markets,238 under this 
factor, the court will consider the effect the misappropriation has on 
licensing markets.  An example is when a celebrity’s misappropriated 
identity is a performance.239  Pursuant to the example from Zacchini,240 
not only did the defendant news company infringe on Zacchini’s 
ability to capitalize on his live performance,241 it also caused 
commercial injury in a licensing market.242  The defendant news 
company infringed Zacchini’s right to license his performance to other 
news companies that may have been willing to pay to broadcast his 
performance at a later date.243  Instead, these companies could use the 
 
233 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984).  
234 For example, in Carson, the court held that the defendant’s use of the phrase “Here’s 
Johnny” for his business capitalized on the reputation of Johnny Carson and therefore 
amounted to an appropriation of his identity. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 
698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983).  
235 In Zacchini, the Court found that the news program’s airing of the plaintiff’s entire act 
hindered the plaintiff’s ability to reap the benefits of his endeavors, and thus was an intrusion 
on his right of publicity.  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 
(1977). 
236 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. d (1995). 
237 Zacchini, 433 U.S at 575. 
238 See supra notes 161-65. 
239 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575. 
240 See supra note 237. 
241 Zacchini, 433 U.S at 575. 
242 A licensing market is similar to a derivative, which is a competing substitute for an 
original work, or identity, in a marketplace that deprives the original owner of significant 
revenue. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 223 (2d Cir. 2015).  In this example, 
the misappropriation of Zacchini’s entire performance created a competing substitute that 
inhibited Zacchini’s ability to raise revenue in the marketplace for his performance. 
243 Zacchini, 433 U.S at 575. 
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misappropriated version broadcasted by the defendant without ever 
obtaining Zacchini’s permission, thus causing commercial injury in a 
licensing market.244  Moreover, under this factor, as demonstrated by 
Zacchini, the plaintiff is entitled not only to protection from lost profits 
from his performance and lost licensing opportunities, but also to 
recover for the commercial value that his performance provided the 
news program.245 
B. A Fifth Factor 
The Lanham Act has been coined the federal equivalent of state 
law right of publicity.246  For this reason, celebrities often couple their 
right of publicity violation claim with a claim for a violation under the 
Lanham Act Section 43(a).247  The premise of a claim under the 
Lanham Act is to protect against use of a celebrity’s identity that is 
unauthorized and likely to falsely imply celebrity endorsement or 
support.248  Courts have considered implementing a likelihood of 
confusion test in right of publicity actions, but have expressed 
concerns to having it be the sole decisive test.249  While on its own, the 
likelihood of confusion test could be insufficient to adequately balance 
the competing right of publicity and First Amendment protections,250 
utilizing the test as a factor in an affirmative defense both exploits the 
advantages of the test while simultaneously diminishing the 
disadvantages.251  Additionally, this factor incorporates the important 
principle that a defendant should not be permitted to unduly benefit 




246 Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 57 (2006). 
247 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(plaintiff brought an action for a violation of her right of publicity and the Lanham Act); 
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff 
brought the action alleging violation of his right of publicity and the Lanham Act). 
248 Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 57. 
249 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that the approach 
“ignores the fact that the artistic work is not simply a commercial product but is also a means 
of communication.”); Id. (finding an unmodified likelihood of confusion approach inadequate 
to account for the full weight of the public’s interest in free expression). 
250 Id. 
251 See supra notes 78-81. 
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identity in the work.252  It also fosters the dual interest of consumers to 
not be misled by the creator, and to enjoy the product of the creator’s 
ability to exercise freedom of expression.253  Moreover, the concerns 
some courts expressed regarding the application of this test to right of 
publicity actions254 are effectively eliminated because the likelihood of 
confusion test is no longer dispositive, and will be weighed with the 
other four factors. 
1. Likelihood of Confusion  
This factor is taken from the part of the Lanham Act255 which 
was discussed in the analysis of the Rogers’ Lanham Act test.256  As 
mentioned in Section V. Part B, celebrities often couple their state law 
right of publicity violation claim with a claim for violation under the 
federal Lanham Act § 43(a).  Grounded on the similarities of the claims 
under both state and federal law,257 this factor incorporates the 
important considerations of the Lanham Act test258 and converts them 
into a separate factor to be used in the Right of Publicity Defense. 
This factor considers whether the use of the celebrity’s identity 
“is likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake, or deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with, or as to 
origin, sponsorship, or approval of”259 the work.  The question under 
this factor is whether the use of the celebrity’s identity in the work 
would cause an individual to believe that the celebrity is somehow 
affiliated with or behind the work.260  The factor effectively eliminates 
the problem that existed with the Rogers’ test261 because it incorporates 
 
252 See supra notes 78-81. 
253 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989). 
254 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 158 (3d Cir. 2013) (suggesting the weakness of 
applying the Rogers’ trademark-based test to right of publicity actions without accounting for 
the difference). 
255 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
256 See supra notes 68-71. 
257 See supra notes 247-48. 
258 See supra notes 68-71. 
259 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(a). 
260 See infra notes 290-95.  The question in Brown was whether the people who play 
Madden NFL would believe that Brown was behind or sponsored the game. Brown v. Elecs. 
Arts, Inc., 2009 WL 8763151, *5. 
261 See supra notes 78-81 (The problem with the Rogers’ test is that it mirrors the Lanham 
Act which requires a showing of a likelihood of consumer confusion while the right of 
publicity requires no such finding). This comment argues that if the defendant in a right of 
publicity action can prove that the likelihood of consumer confusion is insignificant, then the 
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the likelihood of confusion requirement into the new Right of Publicity 
Defense analysis.  Finding a likelihood of confusion is no longer 
considered dispositive and instead will weigh towards right of 
publicity protection.262 
Although the First Amendment guarantees freedom of 
expression,263 no one has a constitutional right to use a celebrity’s 
identity without his permission to draw attention to their creation or 
help sell a product.264  A work that causes confusion regarding the 
celebrity’s participation or endorsement of a work will receive less 
protection under the First Amendment.265  Thus, the fifth factor must 
evaluate the relevance of the celebrity’s identity to the artistic value of 
the work.266  The use of a celebrity’s identity in a work that has no 
artistic relevance whatsoever can implicitly cause a likelihood of 
confusion as to the endorsement or approval of the work by the 
celebrity, and therefore cannot be justified as an interest in freedom of 
expression because the use of the identity provides no artistic value to 
the work.267  The irrelevant use of a celebrity’s identity in a work can 
lead a consumer to believe the celebrity has something to do with the 
work, because for what other reason would the celebrity’s identity be 
used if it is neither artistically relevant, nor an endorsement.268  
Therefore, if there is no artistic relevance at all, this factor will weigh 
against fair use because of the confusion that the use of the celebrity’s 
identity in the work will likely cause consumers.  Additionally, even 
 
factor should weigh in the creator’s favor and lean towards a finding of fair use.  Unlike in the 
Rogers’ test, the fact that someone is likely to be confused by a creator’s work does not 
automatically infringe upon a celebrity’s right of publicity.  Instead, it is a factor to be weighed 
with the other factors under this test. 
262 While the right of publicity does not require a showing of confusion, when claiming this 
defense, a defendant who can show there is no likelihood of confusion will be afforded greater 
protection. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 2:4. 
263 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
264 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 7:3  
265 Id. 
266 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989). 
267 See, e.g., id. at 999 (stating that “a misleading title with no artistic relevance cannot be 
sufficiently justified by a free expression interest.”). 
268 See id. (if the film-maker used the title with no artistic relevance at all, the confusing 
suggestions as to the source implicitly conveyed would violate the Lanham Act).  Even if an 
artist claims that the use of the celebrity’s identity is symbolic, the question of artistic 
relevance remains. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasizing 
that “crying symbol” does not change the question of artistic relevance and automatically 
confer authority to use a celebrity’s identity). 
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when there is a finding of artistic relevance, if the work is explicitly 
misleading or confusing to consumers, the factor will also weigh 
against a finding of fair use.269  For example, in Michael Jordan v. 
Jewel Food Stores, Inc. & Super Valu, Inc.,270 the court recognized that 
Jewel Food Store’s use of the image of Jordan sneakers, on a page that 
also contained the store’s trademarked logo and slogan, was relevant 
because it was placed in a commemorative book praising Michael 
Jordan.271  However, the court also found that Jewel Food Store used 
the image with the specific intent to advertise its store, and recognized 
that a reader could easily mistake the advertisement as an endorsement 
by Jordan.272  Therefore, this use violated Jordan’s right of publicity,273 
and under this factor would weigh against a finding of fair use. 
Furthermore, when the use of a celebrity’s identity in a work 
falls somewhere between these two ends of the spectrum, and is found 
to have at least some artistic relevance and is not explicitly for the 
purpose of confusing consumers, the interest in the First Amendment 
free expression clause will outweigh the right of publicity 
protection.274  When the use of a celebrity’s identity in a work might 
suggest that the celebrity had some sort of role in its production or 
endorsement, even if this suggestion is false, as long as the identity is 
in some way relevant to the artistic value of the work, the factor will 
weigh towards a finding of fair use.275  Therefore, under this factor, 
when the use of a celebrity’s identity is at least slightly relevant to the 
artistic value of the work, and the use does not explicitly mislead the 
consumer as to the content of the work, the factor will lean towards a 
finding of fair use and not towards right of publicity protection.276  For 
example, in Rogers v. Grimaldi, although the title of the film was the 
 
269 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. (stating that even where a title has minimal artistic relevance 
but is explicitly misleading as to the source, a Lanham Act violation can be found). 
270 Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc. & Super Valu, Inc., WL 12-1992, *3 (2014). 
271 Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2014). 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1000. 
275 Id. (emphasizing that “the slight risk that such use of a celebrity’s name might implicitly 
suggest endorsement or sponsorship to some people is outweighed by the danger of restricting 
expression”). See, e.g., Estate of Hemingway v. Random House Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 350 
(1968) (holding that the estate of Ernest Hemingway had no cause of action for unfair 
competition based on likelihood of confusion against the author of a biographical memoir 
entitled “Papa Hemingway.”). 
276 This factor utilizes the Rogers’ test, but instead of a dispositive result under the test, it 
will weigh as a factor in an overall affirmative defense.  
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exact name of two famous dancers, the court found that because the 
title was artistically relevant to the characters in the film, and was not 
explicitly misleading, the title was not a violation of Rogers’ right of 
publicity.277  Thus, under this factor the use of the names in the title of 
the film would lean towards a finding of fair use.  Moreover, this factor 
mirrors the Rogers’ Lanham Act test278 formulated by the Second 
Circuit.  The only difference is that this test is now a factor instead of 
a dispositive test, and therefore it must be weighed with the other four 
factors of the Right of Publicity Defense. 
The court in Brown v. Elecs. Arts, Inc.,279 was influential in 
evaluating the likelihood of confusion for the use of a celebrity’s 
identity in an artistic work.  In that case, James “Jim” Brown, a retired 
professional football player, brought an action against Electronic Arts, 
Inc., (EA),280 creator of the “Madden NFL” video game series, alleging 
the unauthorized use of his identity in the video game.281  Brown sued 
under the Lanham Act,282 similar to the action brought in Rogers v. 
Grimaldi,283 and EA argued that the First Amendment provided a 
complete defense to the alleged Lanham Act violation.284   
In its analysis, the court applied the Rogers’ Lanham Act test 
to determine whether the use of Brown’s identity was protected under 
the First Amendment,285 and determined that there was no remedy for 
Brown under the Lanham Act.286  Moreover, most relevant to the 
analysis of this new factor, the court evaluated whether the use of 
Brown’s identity in the game was misleading to the consumer.287  First, 
the court recognized that a Rogers’ Lanham Act claim will only 
 
277 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001.  The title refers directly to the film’s main characters who are 
known to the audience by the names “Ginger and Fred.” Id. 
278 See supra notes 68-71. 
279 2009 WL 8763151. 
280 “EA develops and publishes [various] video games including Madden NFL.” Id. at 1. 
281 Id.  Each of the games in the series contained up to 170 teams and around 1,500 players.  
The virtual players in the games reflected the real-life players in the NFL, and wore their 
names and numbers while competing in the virtual games. Id. 
282 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (liability for “any person who on or in connection with any goods 
or services … uses in commerce any word … or any false designation of origin, or any false 
misleading description of fact.”). 
283 See supra notes 63-65. 
284 Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *2. 
285 Id. at *3.   
286 Id. at *5 (holding that where there was no consumer confusion, and because of important 
First Amendment interests, there was no remedy under the Lanham Act). 
287 Id.  
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succeed if “the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion 
outweighs the public interest in free expression.”288  Applying the two-
pronged Rogers’ Lanham Act test289 the court recognized that the first 
step is finding that the use of the celebrity’s identity in a work is 
relevant to the work itself.290  The threshold of relevance is particularly 
low, and must “merely be above zero.”291  Under this first prong, the 
court determined that the use of Brown’s image in Madden NFL was 
not irrelevant.292  Madden NFL is a video game about NFL Football, 
and Brown is a legendary NFL football player; therefore, the use is 
undoubtedly relevant.293 
The second step is to determine whether the use of the 
celebrity’s identity “explicitly misleads consumers as to the source or 
content of the work.”294  Under this second prong, the court determined 
that consumers were not likely to believe that Brown was “somehow 
behind the game or sponsors the product.”295  It reasoned that because 
Brown’s identity was only utilized in one of the thousands of virtual 
players in the game,296 and because to conclude that this one player 
signified Brown’s endorsement would require a “leap of logic,”297 
there was not a likelihood of consumer confusion.  The court 
emphasized that the “mere presence”298 in an artistic work does not 
automatically constitute a finding of a likelihood of confusion.299  
Thus, the court held that even when looking at the facts in a light most 
 
288 Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *3. 
289 See supra notes 68-71. 
290 Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *3. 
291 Id.  
292 Id. at *4. 
293 Id. 
294 Id. at *5. 
295 Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *5. 
296 Id.  
297 Id. (stating that “it would require a leap of logic to conclude that the player’s presence 
in the games equates to Brown’s endorsement of the games.”). 
298 Id. (emphasizing that the player’s mere presence in Madden NFL does not constitute 
endorsement); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (stressing that 
mere inclusion of a celebrity identity in a work does not satisfy the likelihood of confusion 
prong of the test). 
299 Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *5 (stating that “EA’s use of Brown’s identity could not 
constitute an explicit attempt to signify that Brown endorsed the games.”). 
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favorable to Brown, First Amendment freedom of expression protected 
EA’s use of Brown’s identity in the video game.300   
This Brown likelihood of confusion analysis301 provides a 
compelling example of the steps that must occur during the 
examination of a claim under this fifth factor.  The inquiry to the 
likelihood of confusion must be two-fold.302  First, the court must 
determine whether the use of the celebrity’s identity is relevant to the 
work at issue.303  Second, the court must determine whether the use of 
the celebrity’s identity “explicitly misleads consumers as to the source 
of the work,”304 to the extent that the public interest in avoiding this 
confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.305  Thus, if 
the court finds that the likelihood of consumer confusion outweighs 
the public interest in freedom of expression, this factor will weigh 
towards right of publicity protection. 
Therefore, in accordance with the court’s analysis in Brown, 
which determined that there was not a likelihood of confusion,306 under 
the fifth factor in the new Right of Publicity Defense, the use of 
Brown’s identity in the work would lean towards a finding of fair use. 
VI. JUSTIFYING THE NEED FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
DEFENSE   
To exemplify the benefits and the correct use of this proposed 
Right of Publicity Defense, this Section will discuss and apply the 
defense to two recent and similar decisions decided by the Third and 
Ninth Circuits in 2013.307   Similar to Brown,308 the cases involve star 
collegiate athletes, who brought actions against EA alleging violations 
 
300 Id.  This result is consistent with the holding in Rogers, which found that the title of the 
movie was protected by the First Amendment, and the mere use of the name did not equate to 
a right of publicity violation. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1000. 
301 See supra notes 288-99. 
302 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1100. 
303 See supra notes 290-97. 
304 See supra note 294. 
305 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001 (recognizing that even when there is risk that a consumer might 
be confused as to endorsement, this risk must outweigh the public interest in artistic 
expression).  
306 Brown v. Elecs. Arts, Inc., 2009 WL 8763151 at *5. 
307 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 
1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
308 2009 WL 8763151. 
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of their rights of publicity by EA for its use of their identities in the 
characters in the video game series “NCAA Football.”309  
The Circuit Courts in both cases utilized the transformative use 
test to reach their decisions.310  Each court emphasized that not only 
were the characters in the video games closely identical in physical 
characteristics to the famous college athletes,311 but the characters 
were also used in the exact context the athletes were found in real life 
– famous student-athletes playing football in football stadiums.312 
Currently, these cases yield corresponding conclusions as a 
result of the transformative use test applied in the decisions.313  Both 
courts determined that the former college athletes are entitled to right 
of publicity protection.314  Moreover, as previously mentioned, the 
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of the First Amendment in 
the right of publicity context since Zacchini in 1977,315 and 
subsequently there has been vigorous expansion of the right of 
publicity,316 with various courts attempting to balance these two 
important rights.317  Thus, although multiple circuits have applied and 
adopted the transformative use test,318 including the Third and Ninth 
Circuits,319 the test has not been unanimously adopted for all right of 
publicity cases which require a balancing of the First Amendment.320  
However, some of the decisions adopting the transformative use test, 
including the Third Circuit decision in Hart,321 and the Ninth Circuit 
decision in Keller,322 also contained stimulating dissenting opinions, 
which criticized the majority’s decision to use or apply the 
 
309 Hart, 717 F.3d at 146-47; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271. 
310 Hart, 717 F.3d at 163; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276. 
311 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (noting that the video game avatar matched Hart in physical 
features as well as accessories worn while he played at Rutgers); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276. 
312 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (emphasizing that the Keller video game 
avatar was a college football player in the “identical setting to where the public found [Keller] 
in his collegiate career: on the football field.”). 
313 Hart, 717 F.3d at 170; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279. 
314 Hart, 717 F.3d at 170; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279. 
315 Hart, 717 F.3d at 152 (stating that “Zacchini is the only Supreme Court case addressing 
the First Amendment in a right of publicity context.”). 
316 See supra notes 41-46. 
317 See supra Section III. 
318 Hart, 717 F.3d at 163; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276. 
319 Hart, 717 F.3d at 163; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276. 
320 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (applying the predominant 
use test); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying the Rogers test).  
321 Hart, 717 F.3d at 170 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
322 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1284 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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transformative use test.323  Notably, the dissenting judges in Hart and 
Keller both criticized the majority’s application of the transformative 
use test.324   
As emphasized by these dissenting judges, the Circuit Courts’ 
decisions in Hart and Keller were motivated by fears of extensive 
misappropriation.325  While applying the transformative use test, the 
Ninth Circuit expressed its wariness of “cynical abuse” by video game 
companies if it decided to recognize the true creative and 
transformative nature of the interactive functions in NCAA Football 
and other video games.326  The courts did not want the balancing tests 
to weigh against right of publicity protections merely because the 
works in question contained “highly creative elements in 
abundance.”327  While these admonitions are significant, the proposed 
Right of Publicity Defense would adequately combat this fear of 
blatant misappropriation.328  Specifically in this instance, the majority 
in both Hart and Keller would have been able to recognize the creative 
and transformative elements in the video games, as was intended by 
the transformative use test,329 because the proposed test’s four 
additional factors would adequately safeguard against any blatant 
misappropriation.330  Thus, the majority’s cautionary approach in both 
 
323 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Company, 332 F.3d 915, 960 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the majority should have applied the test derived in Rogers to correctly 
balance the rights). 
324 Hart, 717 F.3d at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that confining the inquiry to 
the identity alone is flawed, and that “the whole – the aggregate of many parts (including, here, 
many people)– is the better baseline for [the transformative use] inquiry.”); see also Keller, 
724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that “the salient question is whether the 
entire work is transformative, and whether an individual persona or image has been altered.”). 
325 Hart, 717 F.3d at 167 (warning that recognizing the interactive feature as influentially 
transformative could lead to blatant acts of misappropriation, easily protected by including a 
modification feature). 
326 Id. 
327 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 (warning that if not properly considered “acts of blatant 
misappropriation would count for nothing so long as the larger work, on balance, contained 
high creative elements in great abundance.”). 
328 See infra notes 329-30. 
329 See Comedy III Prodc., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 404 (2001) 
(emphasizing that the transformative use test was formulated from the first factor of the 
copyright fair use doctrine).  The first factor of the copyright fair use doctrine determines 
“whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or whether and 
to what extent it is “transformative,” altering the original with new expression, meaning, or 
message.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
330 The dissenting opinions in both Keller and Hart criticize the majority for straying from 
this intended application of the transformative use test as a result of the fear of blatant 
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Hart and Keller reiterates the need for a test that will effectively 
balance the First Amendment and right of publicity protections with 
the utmost fairness.   
A. Applying the Right of Publicity Defense 
Applying the new Right of Publicity Defense to the Hart and 
Keller cases affords a firm example of the effectiveness of this new 
test for right of publicity cases.   
The first factor looks to the nature of the use.331  EA’s use of 
Hart and Keller’s identities in NCAA Football clearly does not fall 
within the categories of criticism, teaching, or research,332 and 
therefore the determination should focus on the degree to which the 
use is transformative.333  In both Hart and Keller, contrary to the 
majority decisions which found that EA’s use of Hart and Keller’s 
identities was not transformative,334 this first factor finds that EA’s use 
is transformative335 and weighs towards a finding of fair use. 
The majority opinions in both Hart and Keller restrict their 
analysis to the individual avatar in the video game alone,336 and fail to 
recognize the transformative elements throughout the entire game.337  
In harmony with the dissenting judges in Hart and Keller, this factor 
considers the transformative elements of a work in its entirety,338 
 
misappropriation and inadequate protection of the right of publicity. Hart, 717 F.3d at 172 
(Ambro, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the majority decision shifted away from the 
traditional transformative use analysis); see also infra notes 349-82 (weighing the remaining 
four factors to ensure that a celebrity’s identity is adequately protected from any blatant 
misappropriation that would exploit the celebrity’s efforts to achieve his famed identity or 
misuse the commercial value of a celebrity’s identity without his  permission). 
331 This factor will refer to the reasoning of the district court decision in Hart, because for 
determination of transformative use, this factor reflects the views of the dissenting judges in 
Hart and Keller and requires that the entire work as a whole be considered, just as the district 
court did in Hart.   
332 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“The fair use of a copyrighted work … for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, 
or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”). 
333 See supra notes 180-84. 
334 Hart, 717 F.3d at 170; Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1279 (9th Cir. 2013). 
335 See infra notes 342-45. 
336 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (emphasizing that the digital avatar of Hart in the game was almost 
identical to Hart’s identity in real life, and therefore determining how the identity was 
incorporated into the game did not matter); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276. 
337 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276. 
338 Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
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including consideration of the purpose of a work,339 and analyzes how 
a celebrity’s identity has been transformed and incorporated into a 
work as a whole.340   
Although the identities of both Hart and Keller in the games are 
actual imitations of the individuals, the entire use of the characters 
within the games as a whole is transformative.341  The video games 
convey the artistic expressions of EA’s design team through the 
games’ graphics and sounds, characters, including characters that are 
not football players, commentary, and game scenarios.342  EA also 
created the interactive ability that gives users a chance to embark on 
their own narrative, allowing them to control the players and teams 
through multiple seasons.343  Moreover, the use of this mechanism that 
grants the gamer a high level of control in the interaction of the game, 
including the ability to adjust the characters and gaming atmosphere in 
various different ways,344 demonstrates that the use is 
transformative.345   
Additionally, NCAA Football has a transformative purpose to 
provide a realistic gaming experience to its users.346  This purpose adds 
something new to the identities of Keller and Hart, altering them to fit 
the interactive objective of the game.347  Moreover, EA’s commercial 
benefit derives from the user’s desire to play the entire video game as 
 
339 Hart, 717 F.3d at 170 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
340 Hart, 717 F.3d at 172 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that to limit the inquiry to 
likeness alone is at odds with previous Supreme Court decisions on the transformative use 
test). 
341 Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that realistic, interactive 
gaming experience as a whole transforms Hart’s individual image); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1288 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (stressing that “only when the creative work is considered in complete 
context can a proper analysis be conducted.”). 
342 Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
343 Id. 
344 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1286 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the gamer can change the 
“abilities, appearances, and physical characteristics,” as well as control the “weather, crowd 
noise, mascots, and other environmental factors.”). 
345 Id.  The majority disagreed with this and dismissed the notion that the interactive feature 
of the video game contributed to the transformative use of the football player’s image. Hart, 
717 F.3d at 166.  The majority feared that recognizing the transformative nature of this feature 
would open the door to blatant acts of misappropriation by video game companies. Id.   
346 Hart, 717 F.3d at 170 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (recognizing that a key to the success of 
NCAA Football is “consumers’ desire to experience a realistic football playing experience 
with their favorite teams.”). 
347 See Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing 
that unchanged copying is permitted where a further purpose is found). 
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a whole, and not solely from the use of either Hart’s or Keller’s identity 
in the game.348  Therefore the commercial value comes from the new 
creation of the interactive game and not from the use of the identities 
of Hart or Keller.  Thus, this factor weighs in favor of EA and a finding 
of fair use. 
The second factor is determined by examining the effort a 
celebrity exercised to establish his famous identity.349  This is 
measured by whether the publicity was earned or incidental.350  In both 
Hart and Keller, the football players are classified as achieving earned 
publicity.  The hard work and dedication each famous collegiate 
athlete devoted to the sport allowed him to excel in college football,351 
and ultimately was the reason his identity was placed in the video game 
in the first place.  Therefore, this factor weighs against finding fair use 
and instead toward the protection of Hart’s and Keller’s right of 
publicity. 
The third factor analyzes the extent of the misappropriation by 
considering the entire work as a whole in comparison to the celebrity’s 
identity.352  Thus, when applying this factor to both Hart and Keller 
the factor considers the extent of the misappropriation with respect to 
the video games in their entirety.  The majority opinions in both Hart 
and Keller are most influential with respect to this factor.  These 
opinions focused on the identities of Hart and Keller compared to the 
virtual characters and the setting of the games.353  As emphasized in 
these two opinions, the identities of both Hart and Keller in NCAA 
Football were realistic portrayals of real life.354  Moreover, the context 
of the avatars encompassing Hart’s and Keller’s identities in the video 
game was the exact context that Hart and Keller were in as collegiate 
 
348 Hart, 717 F.3d at 170. 
349 See supra notes 198-99. 
350 Id. 
351 Ryan Hart Stats, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/college-football/player/stats/_/id/135377/ 
ryan-hart (last visited Mar. 7, 2017); Sam Keller Profile, SUN DEVIL ATHLETICS, 
http://www.thesundevils.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=30300& 
ATCLID=208250752 (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).  
352 See supra notes 219-23. 
353 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166; Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013). 
354 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (noting that the avatar matched Hart in physical features as well 
as accessories worn while he played at Rutgers); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (recognizing that 
the video game character was an almost identical replication of Keller in real life, who is 
represented as “what he was: the starting quarterback for Arizona State”). 
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athletes, playing football in football stadiums.355  Thus, under this 
factor, the quantity of the misappropriation of both Hart and Keller is 
very great.  Although EA argued that NCAA Football contains many 
creative and interactive elements and thus was not strictly a replication 
of Hart’s and Keller’s identities,356 with respect to quantity, the game 
misappropriated both Hart’s and Keller’s entire identities.357   
Arguably, had EA chosen to alter the identities of Hart and 
Keller in the games, creating either unique characteristics or settings, 
the quantity of the misappropriation would not be so great.  For 
example, in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.358 the avatar in the game, 
although evidencing certain similarities, was not a literal depiction of 
Kirby.359  The avatar was created with several unique characteristics, 
and was in a mystical space-age setting, and thus was not a 
misappropriation of the celebrity’s identity.360  Under this factor, had 
EA manipulated the images of Hart and Keller, or changed the setting 
in which these identities were found, similar to Sega of America, the 
quantity of the misappropriation would be low.  However, because the 
avatars embodying Hart’s and Keller’s identities were realistic 
portrayals of real life,361 found in the exact setting as real life,362 the 
misappropriation is very great.  Therefore, this factor will weigh 
against a finding of fair use and instead towards a right of publicity 
protection.    
 
355 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (noting that “the digital Ryan Hart does what the actual Ryan Hart 
did while at Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital recreations of college football 
stadiums”); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (recognizing that the virtual character of Keller 
performed the exact activity he was known for in the game’s setting which “is identical to 
where the public found [Keller] during his college career”). 
356 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276. 
357 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276. 
358 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (2006). 
359 Id. at 59.  
360 Id. (emphasizing that the fictional space setting and role of the character in the game as 
a space-age reporter in the 21st century was not a misappropriation of the celebrity who was 
actually a famous singer). 
361 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (noting that the avatar matched Hart in physical features as well 
as accessories worn while he played at Rutgers); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (recognizing that 
the video game character was an almost identical replication of Keller in real life, who is 
represented as “what he was: the starting quarterback for Arizona State”). 
362 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (noting that “the digital Ryan Hart does what the actual Ryan Hart 
did while at Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital recreations of college football 
stadiums”); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (recognizing that the virtual character of Keller 
performed the exact activity he was known for in the game’s setting which “is identical to 
where the public found [Keller] during his college career”). 
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The fourth factor applied to both Hart and Keller will weigh 
towards a finding of fair use.  This factor considers the effect the use 
of the celebrity’s identity has on the potential market in light of the 
creative elements of defendant’s use.  Notably, the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules restrict the ability of student-athletes to enter into 
licenses with outside companies while they are players in the 
NCAA.363  Thus, because of this restriction, neither Hart nor Keller 
would have been permitted to license his identity to EA during his time 
as a student-athlete.  However, even if these restrictions are set 
aside,364 when the use of these celebrities’ identities is viewed in light 
of the creative elements of NCAA Football, this factor will weigh 
towards a finding of fair use.  NCAA Football, in addition to the 
identities of Hart and Keller, contained many creative and interactive 
elements.365  Unlike in Zacchini, where the celebrity’s entire 
performance was taken and broadcasted identically to how it was 
performed,366 EA added various creative features to NCAA Football 
while simultaneously misappropriating the celebrities’ identities.367  
Thus, under this factor the commercial harm to Hart and Keller is less 
extensive because of the creative and interactive features added to their 
identities.  
Notably, EA is also the creator of several video games based 
on professional sports and athletes.368  EA adequately compensates the 
professional athletes whose identities are utilized as a basis for the 
avatars in these video games.369  Thus arguably, with NCAA 
 
363 Amateurism, NCAA (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism; see also Hart, 
717 F.3d at 146 (recognizing that the NCAA bi-laws prohibit the athlete from using his athletic 
skills for pay in the sport, or permits his name or picture to advertise or promote a product in 
any way). 
364 The NCAA bi-laws, including the amateurism restrictions, are a completely separate and 
complex topic, and therefore for the purposes of this note will not be discussed in detail. 
365 Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 (noting that NCAA Football allows a player to choose the football 
teams to play in a stadium filled with coaches, referees, mascots, cheerleaders and fans, and 
allows the player to control the game for multiple seasons).  
366 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977). 
367 Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that realistic, interactive 
gaming experience as a whole transforms Hart’s individual image); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1286 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the gamer can change the “abilities, appearances, and 
physical characteristics,” as well as control the “weather, crowd noise, mascots, and other 
environmental factors.”). 
368 See Latest Games, EA SPORTS, https://www.ea.com/games (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).  
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amateurism rules370 set aside, Hart and Keller lost the ability to license 
their identities to EA for use in NCAA Football and receive 
compensation similar to that of professional athletes.371  However, this 
factor considers the effect the use of the celebrity’s identity has on the 
potential market in light of the creative elements of the defendant’s 
use.372  Therefore, under this factor, the potential market is considered 
broadly in light of NCAA Football’s various creative elements.373  
Thus, the numerous other licensing opportunities available to both Hart 
and Keller must also be considered.374  Both Hart and Keller can 
license their identities for use in other video games, commercials, or to 
other industries seeking to use their identities for endorsement or 
creative purposes.375  Therefore, under this factor, the interest of free 
expression outweighs the slight harm376 that arguably occurred to the 
plaintiffs’ licensing opportunities in the market of video games, 
specifically the NCAA Football series, and this factor will weigh 
towards a finding of fair use. 
The fifth and final factor determines whether there is a 
likelihood of confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the 
work by determining the relevance of the celebrity’s identity to the 
artistic value of the work, and the likelihood of consumer confusion.377  
Both Hart and Keller are similar to Brown v. Elecs. Arts, Inc.378  In that 
case the court found that there was no likelihood of confusion for the 
use of Brown’s image by EA in its video game series Madden Football.  
 
370 See supra note 363. 
371 See supra note 369. 
372 See supra note 367. 
373 Id.  
374 Celebrities can license their identity, or even appear personally, in commercials and 
advertisements for various products including: food, clothing, technology, sports drinks, etc. 
See Celebrity Endorsements, ADWEEK, http://www.adweek.com/topic/celebrity-endorsements 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2017).   
375 Id. 
376 As a result of the NCAA amateurism requirements, college football players are not 
permitted to be compensated for the use their identities in video games.  In contrast, EA 
compensates the college athletes’ celebrity counterparts for the use of their identities in video 
games.  However, student-athletes in the NCAA forfeit their ability to receive compensation 
by agreeing to the amateurism requirements and contracting with the NCAA. See supra note 
363. 
377 See supra notes 255-58. 
378 2009 WL 8763151. 
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The court’s analysis in Brown,379 applied to both Keller and Hart, 
yields the same conclusion.   
First, the use of Hart’s and Keller’s image in the game does 
have artistic relevance to the game itself: the game is designed to 
provide a virtual college football experience, and they are both college 
football stars.380  Second, as noted in Brown, it is very unlikely that an 
individual playing the game, which has over 1,500 players, would 
assume that the use of either Hart’s or Keller’s identity for one of the 
virtual players represents their sponsorship or creation of the game.381  
Thus, under this two-pronged analysis, there is no likelihood of 
confusion.  
Arguably, while the First Amendment guarantees a freedom of 
expression, it does not grant someone a constitutionally protected right 
to use a celebrity’s identity without his permission to draw attention to 
a creation or help sell a product.382  In both Hart and Keller it appears 
that this is precisely what EA intended by using Hart’s and Keller’s 
image in the video games.383  However, under this likelihood of 
confusion factor, a celebrity will only be successful when the public 
interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest 
in free expression.384  Under this two-pronged analysis, if EA’s use 
was determined to cause a likelihood of consumer confusion, the 
public interest in avoiding this confusion would outweigh the public 
interest in free expression, and thus the factor would lead towards a 
right of publicity protection.  However, this analysis concludes that 
there is no likelihood of consumer confusion.385  Therefore this fifth 
factor in both Hart and Keller will lean towards a finding of fair use. 
Furthermore, the application of the new Right of Publicity 
Defense to both Hart and Keller leans towards a finding of fair use 
 
379 See supra notes 288-99. 
380 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141,158 (3d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that “[g]iven that 
appellant played intercollegiate football, however, products targeting the sports-fan market 
would, as a matter of course, relate to him.”). 
381 Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *5 (noting that Brown’s identity was used in only one of 
the thousands of virtual athletes in the games).  Similarly, Keller and Hart’s identities are used 
in only one of the thousands of athletes in the NCAA Football gaming series. See also Hart v. 
Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d at 174 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (finding that Hart’s image in the game 
does not mislead the public to believe he was the source of the game). 
382 MCCARTHY, supra note 12 at § 7:3. 
383 Hart, 717 F.3d at 146-47; Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013). 
384 Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *3. 
385 See supra notes 380-81. 
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because three out of five of the factors favor fair use.386  The protection 
of EA’s First Amendment free expression rights trumps the right of 
publicity protections of both Hart and Keller.  Thus, under this new 
approach, the decisions in both Hart and Keller, in contrast to the 
actual decisions,387 would both conclude that EA’s use of the plaintiffs’ 
images in the NCAA Football game series constitutes a fair use that is 
protected by the First Amendment. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this proposed Right of Publicity Defense should 
be adopted as the balancing test to be used uniformly throughout all 
the circuits.  The importance of balancing the right of publicity and 
First Amendment protections has been recognized since Zacchini, and 
balancing the rights has proven to be a frustrating task.  This test 
resolves the problems of the existing balancing tests by incorporating 
them as factors to be weighed together.  It provides a clear standard 
that ensures that the right of publicity remains protected without 
hindering creativity and the freedom of expression. 
 
 
386 See supra Section VI. 
387 Hart, 717 F.3d at 170; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279. 
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